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A Design Approach for Safety Based on Product-Service Systems and 
Function-Behavior-Structure 
Abstract: Design for human safety is a complex issue because of the variability of human 
activities, machines and their environment as well as the variability of possible 
interactions between these components. The working situation is comprised of the means 
and the person(s) who act to carry out task(s) in a working environment in accordance 
with the conditions set for carrying out the task(s). The working situation can generate 
the hazardous conditions and undesirables events lead to harm. This paper deals with the 
working situation identifying and analyzing during design to improve safety. Product-
Service System (PSS), which is an integrated combination of products and services that 
shift from product and service systems to product-service systems has been used. The 
Function-Behavior-Structure (FBS), which covers behavior, is considered to include 
product and its utilization. The interaction between PSS and FBS, proposed in present 
paper, allows considering product behaviors and its interaction with service activities. 
This paper proposes a modelling of the transitions between FBS and PSS paradigm to 
distinguish the realization of functions by a product part, a service part or a combination 
of both. The analysis of this interaction is helpful for working situation analysis. Product 
and service behaviors modelling also are proposed in order to help this analysis. The 
applicability of the proposed approach is demonstrated through the application to the 
Power Take-Off (PTO) drive shaft. 
Keywords: design for human safety, working situation, product-service system, 
function-behavior-structure 
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1. Introduction
The main responsibility of making a machine safe lies in the design process (Caputo et 
al. 2013). In this context, the term “Design for Safety” (DfS) captures this effort to 
integrate the knowledge on safety in the design process (Sadeghi et al. 2013). 
The reviewing of the literature shows most of the publications on this subject have 
offered solutions that can be intervene quite late in the design process, often only on the 
detailed design phase, when significant decisions about product principles and structures 
have been taken. The most of methods that are used early in the design process, generally 
set constraints and are used to verify and validate. It should be highlighted the work 
conducted by Ghemraoui and her colleagues (Ghemraoui et al. 2009; Sadeghi et al. 2013). 
Their proposition consists in a general suggestion for systematic risk identification and 
human-safety integration in the early design phase. The reviewing of the literature shows 
that use conditions are not or poorly taken into account during the design phase (Houssin 
et al. 2006) and there are always a gap between what is imagined in design and what is 
lived during the product utilization. Indeed, one of the most important sources of risk is 
linked to variety in working situation. To take into account this variety, idea is designing 
human behaviors performed in working situation in parallel with products, neither 
designing only products nor designing human activities. 
These results demonstrate the growing importance of considering working 
situation as a core element of design for human safety (DfHS). The question then arises 
is: How to integrate working situation into design process? As mentioned previously, 
one of the most important sources of risk is linked to a divergence between expected 
working and real working. This demonstrates that the all the activities related to 
utilization of a system should be considered during design. The working situation 
identifying and analysis during design process allow overcoming this problem. Thus, it 
becomes more a question of How to identify and analysis working situation during 
design process? Whereas, the behavior describes how the system and its components 
perform (Kannengiesser & Gero 2011), so this concept should be considered for working 
situation analysis. Indeed, behavior refers to process or activity to be performed by 
product or human. So, we need a design theory which covers this concept. Thus, the 
question to be answered is How to model the behaviors? 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, terms related to 
DfHS and their definitions have been presented. This section, after description of a 
literature review on DfHS, presents the research objectives of present study. Section 3 
explains the proposed approach to integrate safety in the earliest design phases. In this 
section, working situation identifying and analysis have been described. In order to help 
this analysis, behaviors modelling are proposed. It helps decision making for selecting 
safer product behavior during design process. The effectiveness of the proposed approach 
is demonstrated in Section 4 by applying it to a power take-off (PTO) drive shaft. Finally, 
the conclusions are defined in Section 5. 
2. Research background and objective  
2.1. Terms related to DfHS and their definitions 
Human safety concerns accident prevention in work situations (Sadeghi et al. 2015). 
Work situation is comprised of the means and the person(s) who act to carry out task(s) 
in a working environment in accordance with the conditions set for carrying out the 
task(s). Service is described through the concept of activity. Regarding this any user 
activity performed in working situation then considered as a service. In our context, 
service could be defined as the utilization characteristics of user’s product and all the 
activities related to this utilization. This concept includes addressing user’s safety in 
working situation. Product is physical artefact to satisfy users’ needs. System includes 
product and service. The work situation impacts on the human safety who works with/ 
on/ around of system which may contain hazard. If there is no hazard, there is no 
possibility of a hazardous situation and no possibility of presence of a danger for the 
system.  
A hazardous situation exists when one or more persons are exposed to a hazard. 
If there is a hazard, a hazardous situation is possible. If there is no hazardous situation, 
there is no possibility of presence of a danger for the system. If there is a hazardous 
situation, we consider that the accident is always probable. In this case, a hazardous event 
is possible and there is possibility of presence of a danger for the system. Harm occurs as 
a result of a hazardous event. Risk is defined as an estimate of the probability of 
occurrence of this harm and its severity that could result. Probability is defined as an 
estimate of the probability of a hazardous situation occurring (exposure) and the 
probability of a hazardous situation leading to harm. Severity is defined as an estimate of 
the magnitude of harm. In producing the measure that becomes a statement of risk, it is 
necessary that determinations be made for the:  existence of a hazard(s), exposure to the 
hazard, frequency of endangerment of that which is exposed to the hazard, severity of the 
consequences should the hazard be realized (the extent of harm or damage to people, 
property, or the environment) and probability of the hazard being realized. This risk 
which must avoided, eliminated, or controlled in the design and redesign processes of 
system which will result in improvement in the safety of human at work situation. This 
has been represented in Figure 1. 
As mentioned previously, the aim of the research presented in this paper has been 
to identify and analysis the working situation. For this aim, all the activities related to 
utilization of system should be considered during design. This aspect illustrates that the 
system functions and service activities should be integrated seamlessly from the early 
design phases.  
 
Figure 1. Terms related to DfHS 
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working situation. The working situation analyzing allows formalizing this concept in the 
DfHS context with associating utilization and human activities.  
Current industrial problems mainly concern the environment and the impact of 
mass production/consumption of artefacts (Tomiyama 1997; Umeda et al. 2000). One of 
the identified solutions is the concept of Product-Service Systems (PSS). A PSS is an 
integrated combination of products and services that shift from product and service 
systems to product-service systems. The PSS is used in a broader sense, as a model to 
represent the defined “operating system” composed of interdependent product parts. 
The concepts of product, service, system and working situation are redefined in 
the context of this research as: 
 Product: physical artefact to satisfy users’ needs; 
 Service: utilization characteristics of user’s product and all the activities related 
to this utilization; 
 System: product +service; 
 Working situation: is comprised of the means and the person(s) who act to carry 
out task(s) in a working environment in accordance with the conditions set for 
carrying out the task(s). 
Let us take power take-off (PTO) drive shaft, a means for transmitting rotary 
power from the tractor to the implement, as an example (Figure 2). In PTO drive shaft, 
the movable shaft disengages from kinetic energy. Service is related to one or more 
activities which done by person on or around of PTO drive shaft. Whole of PTO drive 
shaft and the activity done by person near it constitute the system. When the PTO drive 
shaft is operating with missed, broken, damaged or poorly fitting safeguards and a person 
gets close to the PTO drive shaft, there is a potential “entanglement hazard”. The operator 
may be in the vicinity of the source of kinetic energy. This system therefore presents a 
hazardous situation. A human may contact the source of kinetic energy. The PTO drive 
shaft therefore has a dangerous event.  
 
Figure 2. PTO drive shaft accident analysis 
2.2. Literature review on applications of DTM and DTT to analyze and identify 
work situations in DfHS 
To improve human safety during design process, the large number of studies 
covering a wide variety of topics (e.g., Gauthier and Charron 2002; Houssin and 
Coulibaly 2011; Marsot and Claudon 2004; Houssin et al. 2006; Duijne et al. 2007; 
Ghemraoui, Mathieu, and Tricot 2009a, 2009b; Sadeghi et al. 2013a, 2013b, 2015) have 
been developed. Recently, Sadeghi et al. (2016) provided a detailed analysis of the 
literature in order to identify literature trends and emerging research topics in DfHS. 
Figure 3 shows the framework of DfHS. Risk and work situation are two aspects which 
must be considered for human safety. Applying design theories and methodologies 
(DTM) and design tools and techniques (DTT) help to integrate safety in design process. 
For more information on different DTM and/or DTT, the reader can refer to (Andreasen 
2011; Kroll 2013; Lutters et al. 2014; Le Masson, Dorst, and Subrahmanian 2013; 
Tomiyama et al. 2009). These papers classified or provided an overview of DTM and/or 
DTT. 
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The general principles of risk prevention in the work situation can be found 
through DTT. They focused in particular on the applications of DTM and DTT to analyze 
and identify work situations in order to improve human safety in manufacturing system 
design. Table 1 summarizes the results of analysis.  Following DTM and DTT have been 
presented in this table: ‘theory of inventive problem solving’ (TRIZ), axiomatic design 
(AD), function–behavior–structure (FBS), functional analysis (FA), quality function 
deployment (QFD), computer-aided design (CAD), and Risk analysis techniques 
The literature shows that design for human safety is a very complicated subject 
characterized by several factors including systemic, human and environmental ones. 
Consequently, designers tend to use tools and techniques that normally focus on the use 
of a product and not only its design. The literature reviews also showed that the conditions 
of utilization are not or are hardly taken into account during the design phase, and that 
there is always a gap between what is imagined in the design and what is experienced 
when using the product. Indeed, one of the main sources of risk is linked to the variety of 
work situations. To take into account this variety, the aim in design is to take into account 
human behaviors demonstrated in work situations in parallel with the product, so as not 
to focus only on product design or only on designing human activities.  
 
Figure 3. Framework of DfHS (Sadeghi et al. 2016) 
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The function allocation to the product part, the service part, or a combination of 
both should be determined. Therefore, we need a design theory which models this 
allocation of functions.  By looking far beyond these review developments on DTM, our 
expect to “safe design” can be achieved by using the FBS, which covers behavior, seems 
appropriate to include product and its utilization. FBS theory emphasizes the need to 
consider human performance in the design process, thus permitting work situation 
analysis. 
The application of FBS in human safety has been relatively rare. The authors of 
(Houssin, Sun, and Gardoni 2010; Sun et al. 2013) focused on integrating the utilization 
conditions of mechanical products in the design process. In (Houssin et al. 2010) they 
proposed a global view of the Behavioral Design Approach (BDA) to help designers to 
analyze the interaction between user tasks and technical tasks, to evaluate system 
performance and find potential hazards. Then, in order to build a computer-aided system 
based on the BDA, they proposed a system framework for the BDA based on the 
hierarchical information model for engineering design (Sun et al. 2013). The UML was 
used to model the BDA system (Sun et al. 2013), by translating behavioral design 
modelling and their information models into computer language.  
In these works, the behavior concept of FBS was used to define system (structure) 
behavior and user behavior. Analyzing the integration of these two behaviors allows 
determining the global behavior in a work situation. However, this analysis is more useful 
for making comparisons than for creating designs. It should be noted that here, user 
behavior concerns the user’s task and does not include the service done by them. To 
overcome the shortcomings of these works, FBS can be integrated with Product-Service 
Systems (PSS).  
It extends the traditional functionality of a product by incorporating additional 
services. There are mainly three kinds of PSSs considered in literature ( Yang, Moore, 
Pu, & Wong, 2009):  
 Product-oriented PSS: A product is enhanced with services as a support of its use 
along its life-cycle from the selling (e.g. financial facilities) to the disposal (e.g. 
recycling). The client owns the product and has the possibility to buy additional 
services to improve his experience. The product is little, or not, impacted by these 
service additions. Its lifetime is expected to be improved compared to a standard 
manufacturing product (Cook et al. 2006). 
 Use-oriented PSS: A product is no longer sold to the client; it remains the property 
of the provider. The client benefits from its use over a determined period he paid 
for. The product is impacted in its design as the main purpose is to have high 
usage intensity to generate income (Yang et al. 2009). There is service integration 
to a usable/available product. This integration requires a re-engineering of an 
existing product to adapt some of its properties in terms of robustness and 
integrity. 
 Result-oriented PSS: The product is no longer an issue for the client, only the 
quality of the result is. A functionality provided by a product is replaced by a pure 
service. There is service substitution (Sundin et al. 2009) to a buyable product. In 
this case, the providers’ degree of expertise about the product’s use is somehow 
highlighted or recognized which guarantees a higher efficiency. Consumer goods 
become professional equipment which requires high technical skills when 
manipulated. 
In terms of business models, the main difference between each one could be 
synthesized into the degree of ownership sold to the consumer: property of the product, 
property of its use, and property of its results (Cook et al. 2006). It demonstrates a shift 
in business strategy from a product-oriented to a service-oriented focus (Tan et al. 2009) 
where the value of the product is transferred to its utility or purpose (i.e. the result) from 
the client’s perspective (Vasantha et al. 2012).  
We are interested in use of PSS in this research because this research study is 
looking at the interaction between product and service. According to (Baines et al. 2007) 
a PSS is an integrated product and service offering that delivers value in use to the 
customer. They highlight the aim of PSS is to value asset performance rather than 
ownership and differentiation through the integration of products and services. Therefore, 
PSS could be used as a model to represent the defined “operating system” composed of 
interdependent product parts (e.g. component) and service parts (i.e. human-intensive 
activity). 
The PSS which represents one of the product parts depends on its definition to the 
service part. In this research, the scope of the object of study is not limited to a physical 
artefact but enlarged to the service provided through it. Unlike a product, service 
components are often not physical entities. In PSS concept, service is incorporated into 
the design space, which has been traditionally dominated by products. Its integration in 
the scope introduces a new complexity in the requirements definition of the system. The 
object of study is then considered as an “operating system”. The dependency between 
these two parts and their mutual integration should be developed in our study. 
2.3. Research objective 
FBS modelling covers the aspect of behavior and models this allocation of functions. 
Regarding the PSS paradigm, they made a distinction between two kinds of behaviors: 
service behaviors and product behaviors. In other words, the interaction between PSS and 
FBS allows considering product behaviors and their interaction with service behaviors. 
The analysis of interaction between PSS and FBS allows considering any user activity 
performed in a work situation. The aim is to design human behaviors and products in 
parallel, not by designing only products or designing only human activities. This allows 
identifying and analyzing the work situation from the conceptual design phase. 
Our system is composed of a dynamic service part and a static product part 
modelled in the PSS paradigm. With this PSS paradigm comes a new issue relevant to 
the conceptual design phase of PSS development: the function allocation to the product 
part, the service part, or, in our case, a combination of both. We need a design theory 
which models this allocation of functions. In the next section, a literature review on design 
theories and methodologies will be presented to select the appropriate one for our 
research.  
The FBS modelling covers behavior aspect and models this allocation of 
functions. Regarding the PSS paradigm, they did a distinction between two kinds of 
behaviors: behaviors of the service and behaviors of the product. In other words, the 
interaction between PSS and FBS allows considering product behaviors and its 
interaction with service behaviors. The analysis of interaction between PSS and FBS 
allows considering any user activity performed in working situation. The aim is designing 
human behaviors and products in parallel, neither designing only products nor designing 
human activities. This allows identifying and analyzing working situation form 
conceptual design phase. 
Next section proposes a design approach for safety based on interaction between 
PSS and FBS which allows integrate working situation into design from earliest design 
phases. 
3. Design for human safety based FBS and PSS 
The basis of this proposition is Gero’s FBS paradigm applied to structure more 
precisely the requirements definition of systems with the following definitions 
(Kannengiesser & Gero 2011): 
 Function – Teleology of the artefact, what is it for. 
 Behavior – Attributes derivable from the structure, what it does. 
 Structure – Components and their relationships of an artefact, what it consist of. 
The FBS “ontology” is not limited to the description of the design objects. This 
framework is also used to model the design process (Gero & Kannengiesser 2004) as 
precise as possible. Figure 4 shows the eight fundamental processes of Gero’s FBS. 
 
Figure 4. Gero’s FBS framework (Gero 1990) 
The starting point was originally the concept of Function as the purpose of the 
system to design. Later, it changed to become the concept of Requirement, an input given 
to the designer by the customer that indicates the design problem. The last step of the 
design process (i.e. the description of the design, e.g. CAD drawings and component lists) 
used for construction or manufacture. 
In FBS modelling a function is defined as a description of behaviors abstracted 
by human through recognition of the behaviors in order to utilize it (Umeda et al. 1990) 
and represented as an association of two concepts: symbol of human intention represented 
in the form of to do something, and behaviors that can exhibit the function. The basis of 
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this proposition is Gero’s FBS “ontology” applied to structure more precisely the 
requirements definition of systems with the following agreed upon definitions based on 
(Kannengiesser & Gero 2011): 
 Function – What the system should be able to achieve expressed in terms of 
purpose, what it is for. 
 Behavior – How the system is expected to perform its functions and when. It 
describes how the system and its components perform. 
 Structure – Who performs the functions inside the system, which components, 
and their relationships. It describes the internal composition of the system, what 
it physically is, but also where it is in the construction. 
Regarding the PSS paradigm, therefore, we make a distinction between two kinds 
of behaviors: behaviors of the Service part (i.e. Activity) and behaviors of the Product 
part (i.e. attribute derivable from the structure). A Behavior is an activity (action or 
reaction) or a property of a system (or subsystem) under certain circumstances or 
triggering events, associated with or derived from its Structure (i.e. its components) 
explaining the How and When does/can the system perform a Function?. Structure refers 
to physical and virtual components of the system, their (static) description (i.e. 
characteristics), and their relationships describing what it is composed of, more generally 
answering the Who (i.e. which resource) has to act in the system to perform a Function 
when needed, and Where is it performed? 
The behavior includes the concept of product properties. A product property 
represents a “passive” behavior that can realize a function. It is an alternative to an activity 
which can be considered as an “active” behavior of the PSS system. Therefore, we 
propose to use the Behavior construct to model and support the function allocation to the 
product part through properties or the service part through activities of our systems. 
The FBS paradigm developed by Gero models the design process using 
relationships between three main constructs: Function, Behavior, and Structure (Gero 
1990). This FBS paradigm is used as a basis to model and structure the transition from 
needs to requirements and the allocation of functions to the different parts of our system.  
Some researchers proposed FBS models. Christophe et al. extends the FBS model and 
presents its practical implementation through ontology and SysML language (Christophe 
et al. 2010). Labrousse and Bernard proposed a generic and structuring model based on 
the FBS concepts. These concepts are applied to four objects (PPRE): the Processes, the 
Products (objects stemming from the processes), the Resources (objects needed to realize 
the processes) and the External effects (constraints having an influence on the processes) 
(Labrousse & Bernard 2008). Qin et al. developed knowledge representation model, 
based on FBS, for capturing useful design knowledge and experience for future reuse 
which is named Requirement–Function–Behaviour–Structure–Evolution (RFBSE) 
knowledge(Qin et al. 2017). Regarding the PSS paradigm, we, therefore, make a 
distinction between two kinds of behaviors: behaviors of the service part and behaviors 
of the product part. 
3.1. Proposed approach 
This section proposes a modelling of the transitions between FBS and PSS paradigm to 
distinguish the realization of functions by a product part, a service part or a combination 
of both. Based on the additional construct and definition, the conceptual model of the 
definition domain has to be updated to reflect the changes. Goals are still achieved by 
functions. Functions are now realized through behaviors. The behaviors can be either an 
activity (i.e. behavior associated to the service part), or a property (i.e. behavior associated 
to the product part). Behaviors are assigned to a structure element which can be a human 
or material resource, or a space. The proposed approach is decomposed into 6 steps 
(Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. The proposed design for human safety approach 
Step 1. Goal definition: Goals represent the desired state of affair or condition to 
achieve through the system’s creation. Goals of the System (GSys) are the input of the 
design process; they are defined and refined with the client. Goals drive the decisions 
along the framework. 
Step 2. Function generation: When a goal cannot be further refined, a function 
(FSys) has to be formulated to express what the system should do to attain this goal. During 
this step, the designer transforms states of affairs or conditions of the environment to 
achieve or maintain into abilities of action by the system, independently from the 
technical solutions. 
Step 3 and Step 4. Function allocation: The objective is to define how functions 
will be implemented in terms of behaviors associated to main structure elements. The 
function allocation to either SPro or SSer consists in refining the BSys into Behaviors of the 
Product (BPro) and Service (BSer) parts. After knowing what the system (SSys) should do 
(FSys), it is necessary to define how it will be done but also to detail which part of it will 
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do it (i.e. SPro or SSer). A Function is performed (3) through Behavior of the system (BSys) 
seen as a black box. The function allocation to either SPro or SSer consists in refining the 
BSys (4) into Behaviors of the Product (BPro) and Service (BSer) parts. It corresponds to the 
definition of the design strategy of the system (SSys). 
Step 5. Behavioral refinement: The behavioral refinement consists in describing 
the internal functioning (5.1) of the SSys necessary to fulfil the FSys allowing the 
achievement of the GSys in terms of its components’ behavior (BSer and BPro). These 
behaviors refer to processes and activities to be performed (5.2) by a set of resources (SSer 
and SPro). Each activity and resource requires certain conditions to be performed or used. 
Step 6. Processing (or Behavior-Structure balance): The behavioral refinement 
generates a lot of information. The objective of the processing is to reduce the amount of 
requirements.  At this step, dependencies between behaviors and structure elements are 
checked for requirements consistency with the clients (e.g. limited number of structure 
elements can only ensure limited number of behaviors). A balance between them is 
performed to modify, reduce or delete requirements on the system according to the 
defined goals. The requirements processing is performed in three steps. The main 
principle is that each operation is defined with a set of constraints and requirements. In 
order to manipulate the requirements, a design artefact is introduced: the meta-space. A 
meta-space regroups all the requirements about an operation to perform. Therefore, an 
operational meta-space gathering all the necessary conditions is assigned to each 
operation (6.1). This operational meta-space is considered as part of the product’s 
behavior (BPro). As a result, there are as many operational meta-spaces as operations to 
perform. Based on information about the processes (BSer and BSys), the operational meta-
spaces can be linked to each other (6.2). The amount of operational meta-spaces is 
reduced through their grouping based on their conditions (6.3). 
3.2. Model used  
The objective of this section is to modelling product and services behaviors in 
order to help working situation analysis. To this aim, we focus just on step 5 (Behavioral 
refinement) and step 6 (Processing) of proposed approach. 
3.2.1. Behaviors identification 
As mentioned previously Product behavior (BPro) refer to expected behaviors of 
the product part of the system under specific conditions. Pailhès et al. (2011) used energy 
term to identify the action that the system must carry out to the function that this system 
must achieve. They proposed four following behaviors: 
 Convert (C) imported energy into energy, that is, usable by the other system 
components (input energy is type 1 and output energy is type 2); 
 Transmit (T) energy to with no change in energy type (input and output energy 
are identical type 2); 
 Operate (O) the action required by the system or the unit using transmitter output 
power; and 
 Control-command (C/C) to ensure that the functions of the different components 
are properly carried out. 
These elements have been shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Energetic view of the law of completeness of system parts (Pailhès et al., 
2011) 
In addition of these four product behaviors, we add three other: 
 Protect (P) persons from the hazards; 
 Transfer (T) the place of product;  
 Connect (C) one product to another one. 
Therefore, in this paper, product behaviors are considered: Convert energy, 
Transmit energy, Operate, Control, Pr3otect, Transfer, Connect (CTOC-PTC). 
Service behavior (BSer) describe expected behaviors of the service part of the 
system. Several classifications of the sub-phases of the system’s use phase exist. For the 
use phase (Caputo et al. 2013), the term “operational phase” is used and includes the 
following activities: installation, operation, cleaning, maintenance and decommissioning. 
A classification is adopted grouping all the activities and states of the system’s five sub-
phases: assembly, installation, commissioning (e.g. towing, connection, mounting), 
transport (e.g. moving the system from storage to the place of use, loading and unloading 
the system, setting the system’s transportation configuration, etc.), use (e.g. start-up and 
operation of the system, setting and controlled operation), dismantling, decommissioning 
(e.g. disconnection, uncoupling between two storage uses) and maintenance (e.g. 
maintenance, lubrication, cleaning, fault finding, repair). In this paper BSer limited into: 
Displacement, Install, Operate, Repair, Inspect, and Maintain. 
BPro and BSer are two separate but interrelated sets of descriptions, so the 
dependency relationships between and within BPro and BSer are much more complicated 
than in simple product or service design. In order to illustrate the interaction between BPro 
and BSer, we propose a diagram named proximity diagram consists of two circles in which 
one CTOC-PTC of system is placed in the center of them. These circles show working 
situation and the existence of relationships between users and one CTOC-PTC of system. 
The activities which are performed on the part are presented in inner circle and outer 
circle includes the activities which are performed near the product (not on the product 
directly). Indeed, each activity is connected to the product with an arrow and its duration 
and frequency are illustrated in the parenthesis on the corresponding arrow. Reduction of 
the frequency and/or duration of exposure to hazard are depicted in the standard as an 
alternative of eliminating hazardous situation. The frequency and duration of exposure to 
CTOC-PTC of system should be considered in working situation analysis. A simple of 
proximity diagram is shown in Figure 7. This diagram will be applied to working situation 
analysis in the next section.  
 
Figure 7. Proximity diagram 
3.2.2. Behavior modelling 
The effective integration of product behaviors and service behaviors 
(product/service system) is essential to working situation analysis. Service behaviors 
(BSer) helps to risk analysis related to user activity performed in working situation. The 
question that arises is: How to analyze the risk? A key aspect of safety improvement is 
the use of past experiences (experience feedbacks), such as incidents and accidents. The 
accidents investigation aims at discovering the causes that led to the accident in question. 
Accident investigation is thus an essential first step in the design and implementation of 
adequate preventive measures, with the objective of preventing similar accidents from 
 
Activity b 
One CTOC-PTC of system 
dj: Duration of activity on the product. 
fj: Frequency of activity on the product 
di: Duration of activity near the product 
di: Frequency of activity near the product. 
 
(dj,fj) 
(di,fi) 
occurring again (Johnson & Holloway 2003). Therefore, understanding the causes of 
accident in the work place is an essential step toward DfHS.  
Accident scenario definitions help to describe the reasons of accidents occurrence. 
One of the documents for describing the accident scenario is called the accident report. 
Accident reports provide details on factors that can cause harm. On the other hand, 
hazardous conditions can be identified based on information from accident reports. After 
analysis of different accident reports, Sadeghi et al. listed the following information 
useful for hazardous conditions identification: type of harm, type of accident (its 
consequences and origin), and conditions of accident (usage phase, task, state of machine, 
unintended behavior of the operator, the presence of others, environment conditions) 
(Table 2) (Sadeghi et al. 2015). This table allows gathering, in a synthetic representation, 
all the elements that contributed to an accident. 
Table 2. Accident analysis information 
 Information related to accident 
Harm - The affected body part 
- Type of injury 
Type of accident   - Consequence of accident 
- Source of accident 
Conditions 
of accident 
Operating conditions 
of the system 
- Use phase  
- Operator’s task  
- State of the machine 
Behavior and 
capabilities of operator 
- Operator’s behavior 
- Operator’s capabilities 
Environment 
conditions 
- The presence of other persons (unrelated to the 
task) 
- The open or closed environment 
- Structured or outdoor environment 
If service behavior develops an accident, the question that arises at this point is: 
How can mitigate the risk? To mitigate the risk three solutions could be proposed (Figure 
8): 
 Modifying product behavior. First solution could be replacing the BPro with 
another safer BPro. For example, to prevent entanglement with rotating element, 
replace this element with another element like hydraulic element. Here, the 
designer must stay in the same hierarchical level of Product-Service 
decomposition and the looking for BPro. This search step of removing the hazard 
can bring the designer to provide innovative design solutions. At this stage, it is 
difficult for the designer to judge the safety of new solution. 
 Adding new product behavior. Second solution to mitigate the risk is to add 
another BPro related to the hazard. For example, add safety protection to prevent 
risk related to entanglement with rotating element. Here, the designer must seek 
to eliminate access to the hazardous zone. By applying this solution a parallel 
design process can be started.  
 Modifying service behavior. Risk mitigation can be achieved through modifying 
service behavior (BSer).  
 
Figure 8. Risk mitigation through three solutions 
The first solution is “modifying BPro”. At this level, the designer must ask the 
question: “Can the BPro be modified and is this desired?” If the answer is positive, the 
solution is set. If the answer is negative, the question that the designer must ask is:  “Can 
new BPro be added and is this desired?” If the answer is positive, the target is set. 
Otherwise, proceed to the following solution, “modifying BSer”. 
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These three solutions allow designing human activities in parallel with products, 
neither designing only products nor designing human activities after products. This is the 
advantages of safety improvement during design process based on FBS rather than 
another research works. In a working situation, this zone is created by a system or 
component carrying out an operation or running off-load. For each BSer, the associated 
accidents and hazards in the working situation should be defined. After the hazard(s) is 
(are) identified, designer can mitigate the risk related to this (these) hazard(s) through two 
different solutions.  
The new solution is chosen, it is necessary to ensure safety until the end of the 
design process. In the end of design, if there are still safety problems not solved following 
this approach, they must be translated in the form of recommendations. These 
recommendations for operators, aim to guide them to a good and safe use of the system. 
4. Case study: Power Take-Off (PTO) drive shaft  
Currently, the farming sector constitutes a serious problem in the domain of human safety. 
In this sector, one of the main sources of safety risks is related to Power Take-Off (PTO) 
drive shaft. Figure 9 shows a PTO drive shaft. The PTO drive shaft a removable device 
for transmission mechanical energy connected to the tractor and to the implement 
provided at the rear of a tractor by Power-Input Connection (PIC). 
The existing PTO drive shaft is the result of almost one century of technical 
evolution and more than 80 years of safety evolution. Nevertheless, along with the 
extensive work done to improve the safety of PTO, this system is one of the oldest and 
most persistent hazards associated with agricultural machinery, and it is extremely 
dangerous even with safeguards. The patent evolution confirms the first concept (using 
the rotating element to transform tractor energy to implement) has not changed and thus, 
more patents have been investigated to improve the PTO drive shaft from the safety point 
of view.  
 
Figure 9. Power Take-Off (PTO) drive shaft (Sadeghi et al. 2015) 
The accident analysis shows that a person is at an increased risk of having an 
accident if they are in the vicinity of a PTO system with a missing, broken, damaged or 
poor fitting safeguard (Sadeghi et al. 2013; Sadeghi et al. 2015). Table 3 shows the results 
of one selected accident report analysis related to this system. 
Table 3. The results of a PTO drive shaft accident analysis 
 Accident  
Harm - Death  
Type of accident  - Consequence of accident: entanglement  
- Origin of accident: rotating element 
Conditions 
of accident 
Operating 
conditions of 
system 
- Use phase: use  
- Task: the victim and another person were making concrete with a 
cement mixer driven by a shaft connected to the PTO of the tractor 
- State of the machine: operated normally but with a broken guard 
Behavior and 
capabilities of 
operator 
- Unintended behavior of the operator: operator had been trained in 
how to use the machine, he was experienced, he had no physical 
limitations, but he was in a stressful condition. 
Environment 
conditions 
- The presence of other persons than the operator  
- Open environment  
- Outdoor environment 
 
 
From the side of the tractor From the side of the implement  
PTO guard 
Restraining member 
Guard 
Guard cone 
Power Take-Off (PTO) shaft  
PTO drive 
shaft support 
Power-Input Connection (PIC) 
PIC guard 
PTO drive shaft 
without safeguard 
PTO drive shaft 
Figure 10 shows CTOC-PTC diagram for PTO drive shaft. For this product, input 
and output energy are mechanical energy. 
 
Figure 10. CTOC-PTC diagram for PTO drive shaft 
The proximity diagram related to the accident related to this system is shown in 
Figure 11. The operator exposure time near the hazard for a complete cycle is, on 
average, 8 h for 12 h work cycle. The analysis of the accident report shows that accident 
result in entanglement of the operator around the PTO drive shaft with a broken safeguard 
during its utilization.  
Figure 11. Proximity diagram for PTO drive shaft 
The accident analysis confirms that PTO drive shaft safeguards still don’t ensure 
human safety. A person is at an increased risk of having an accident if they are in the 
vicinity of a PTO system with a missing, broken, damaged or poor fitting safeguard. In 
fact, in the case of missing, broken, damaged or badly fitting safeguards of the system, 
Transmit Tractor Implement  
E
mechanical 
 
  
E
mechanical 
 
  
 
Transmit energy 
di: Duration of activity near the part 
di: Frequency of activity near the part  
 
(di,fi) 
Activity a: the victim and another person were 
making concrete with a cement mixer driven by a 
shaft connected to the PTO of the tractor 
this system will be very dangerous (Sadeghi et al. 2013) and workers will be killed or 
injured as a result of contact with rotating element (Figure 12). 
  
Figure 12. Accident analysis results 
The accident cause is related to performing an activity by person on or around the 
PTO drive shaft. Whereas, the rotating element is the origin of entanglement therefore 
the risk related to this hazard must to be mitigated. To achieve this aim, as illustrated in 
Figure 13, there are three solutions: 
 The first solution (a): replace rotating element (BPro) with another element like 
hydraulic element (BPro). This solution allows eliminating the entanglement risk 
through rotating element. 
 The second solution (b): use guards to cover the rotating elements or they propose 
protective devices to shut the PTO drive shaft systems down once the operator is 
in the hazardous zone. 
PTO drive 
shaft works 
Person gets close to 
the PTO drive shaft 
Entanglement 
Missed, broken, damaged or 
poorly fitting safeguards 
 The third solution (c): replace the BSer with another BSer. Here, BSer is related to 
performing an activity by person on or around the PTO drive shaft. In this case, 
BSer cannot be modified.  
Figure 13. Mitigation the risk related to entanglement with rotating element 
The CTOC-PTC diagrams for solutions (a) and (b) have been shown in Figure 
14. For solution (a), tractor mechanical energy should be converted to hydraulic energy 
and then hydraulic energy should be transmitted. Hydraulic energy should be then 
converted to mechanical energy. For solution (b), input and output energy are mechanical 
energy, but “protect” behavior should be added as a control element.  
BPro: transmit the power with rotating element BSer: perform an activity by person 
on or around the PTO drive shaft 
BPro: protect PTO drive shaft 
B
Pro
: transmit the power with rotating element BSer: perform an activity by person 
on or around the PTO drive shaft 
 BPro: transmit the power by hydraulic element 
 
(a) Replace the BPro with another safer BPro to mitigate the risk related to entanglement by rotating 
element 
(b) Add another BPro to mitigate the risk related to entanglement by rotating element 
B
Pro
: transmit the power with rotating element BSer: perform an activity by person 
on or around the PTO drive shaft 
(c) Replace the B
Ser
 with another B
Ser
 to mitigate the risk related to entanglement by rotating element 
B
Ser
: - 
 Figure 14. CTOC-PTC diagrams for solutions (a) and (b) 
Hydraulic systems have a nasty way of retaining pockets of high pressure. The 
accident analysis shows, the possibility of injection hazard by these systems. The 
injection hazard can result in tissue damage, amputation, or at worst, death. An injection 
injury is caused by a fluid being injected into and under a person’s skin at pressure. The 
pressure fluid results for example from a leaking hydraulic hose or fitting, a split in an air 
pipe and etc. 
These two solutions allow mitigating the entanglement risk with rotating element 
for transmission mechanical energy connected to the tractor and to the implement. 
Continuing design process to complete it is not the objectives of this study.  
5. Conclusions 
Although there exist the numerous researches for improve human safety during design 
process, there still exists a gap between what is imagined in design and what is lived 
during the product utilization. To overcome this gap, this research proposed to integrate 
and analysis working situation during design.  
As a general conclusion, we are interested in use of Product-Service Systems 
(PSS) in this research because this research study is looking at the interaction between 
product and service to identify and analyze the working situation. The proposed approach 
is based on the Function-Behavior-Structure (FBS) modelling, which covers behavior 
Convert 
 
Tractor Implement  
Emechanical  
 
Transmit Tractor Implement  
Protect 
Transmit 
 
Convert 
E
mechanical 
 
  
E
mechanical 
 
  
E
mechanical 
 
  
Ehydraulic 
  
E
hydraulic
 
  
(a) 
(b) 
aspect and models this allocation of functions. Regarding the PSS paradigm, we make a 
distinction between two kinds of behaviors: behaviors of the service part and behaviors 
of the product part. In other words, the interaction between PSS and FBS allows 
considering product behaviors (BPro) and its interaction with service behaviors (BSer). The 
analysis of this interaction is helpful for working situation analysis. Indeed, the research 
novelty of our work lies in that by taking the dynamic service part, it allow to analyse 
working situation during design. Hence, this study applies to consider any user activity 
performed in working situation. Product and service behaviors modelling are proposed in 
order to help this analysis. 
This paper argues designing human activities performed in working situation in 
parallel with products, neither designing only products nor designing human activities. 
The major characteristic of this research is both product and service are considered from 
the conceptual design phase. This enables designers to achieve more efficient results on 
safety improvement in the design process. The applicability of the approach is 
demonstrated through the application to a Power Take-Off (PTO) drive shaft. For this 
system, two solutions are listed to mitigate the entanglement risk with rotating element 
for transmission mechanical energy connected to the tractor and to the implement. 
Our proposition allows avoiding risks in the case that risk is known and accidents 
have occurred in the past. A possible extension for future work is that now that it is 
possible to identify working situations that have been of risk in the past, would it be 
possible to predict potential new dangerous working situations induced by the newly 
designed solutions. This would show that not only you can reduce risks from well-
identified situations but also prevent new risky situations to occur. 
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